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Abstract— The traces (digital evidence) created by users can 
be influenced by the parameters transmitted by the web server. 
HTTP header entries instruct the web browser or web server to 
perform certain functions. These include, for example, the 
criteria according to which content is to be cached on the client. 
If these effects are unknown to the investigators, this can be 
erroneously classified as manipulation. In addition, it is now 
being considered that new traces can be created by header 
entries that are not yet in the focus of the common investigation 
procedures. In this work, a demo application was used to 
investigate which parameters have an influence on the forensic 
investigation of traces of Mozilla Firefox.  
Keywords—webbrowser, webserver, http, web forensics, 
browser history analysis  
I. INTRODUCTION 
More and more frequently, web applications are being 
used, replacing classic desktop applications in some areas. 
This can be seen in the example of mail clients, where a 
webmail service is now positioned above desktop software in 
the email client market share ranking [1]. Due to the wide 
range of functionalities and the intensive use of web 
applications, forensic analysis of the traces generated by a web 
browser is therefore of great interest. For this reason, there are 
many instructions and tools in this area to analyze the 
chronicle. 
However, the rapid development of web browsers ensures 
that new functions are constantly being introduced, which 
cannot then be processed by the forensic tools. And at the 
same time the generated traces can be influenced by setting 
header entries by the web server. HTTP headers let the client 
and the server pass additional information with an HTTP 
request or response. These entries can, for example, cause no 
cached contents to be saved. During a forensic investigation, 
this could lead investigators to classify the missing data as 
manipulation. This would result in an incorrect investigation 
report. Header entries can also create new traces, which can 
be used by investigators to prove that a specific website has 
been visited even though the user has deleted the history data. 
Consequently, this led us to the following research questions: 
R1 Which header entry has influence on the storage of the 
data on the client? 
R2 Which header entry generates additional information 
outside the chronicle? 
To answer this question a demo application was 
developed, which contains the corresponding entries. These 
were called up and then the resulting traces were analyzed. 
A. Limitations 
The focus of this paper is on the investigation of possible 
web browser artifacts through HTTP header entries. The web 
browser Mozilla Firefox was selected for the investigation. 
Only the changes on the client side are examined and the 
effects on the server side are therefore not considered any 
further. At the same time, the most important options were 
selected that have an influence on the cache or result in an 
entry.  
B. Related work 
In the area of Web Browser Forensics there are several 
research projects. They often focus on privacy modes [2][3] 
and the Tor Browser [4][5]. In addition, there are other papers 
that have dealt with the general analysis of artifacts [6] or have 
studied the Firefox web browser in particular [7]. This work 
differs from the other works in that it focuses on the 
connection between the header entries of the web server and 
the behavior of the web browser. 
II. METHODOLOGY 
In order to systematically investigate this area, the relevant 
header entries were first identified, then a demo application 
was developed and finally the investigation was executed and 
the results were evaluated.  
A. HTTP Header 
An overview of the available HTTP headers is described 
in RFC4229[8]. However, since not all header fields are 
supported by Mozilla Firefox, the overview of the Mozilla 
Developer Network[9] was also used. 
The next step was to select the headers according to the 
following criteria: They change the behavior of the web 
browser as content is cached or generate additional entries that 
are not linked to the history. Only response headers are 
considered. Therefore, the following header entries are 
examined: 
 Cache-Control 
 Clear-Site-Data 
 Strict-Transport-Security 
B. Investigation Environment 
A virtual system was used for the analyses. As a host 
system a computer running Windows 10 (Version 1903 - 
Build 18362.535) was used. VMware® Workstation 15 Player 
(Version 15.5.1 build-15018445) was utilized as virtualization 
software. Ubuntu 19.10 was chosen as the system for the 
investigation. There the Apache web server in version 2.4.41 
with PHP (libapache2-mod-php) in version 7.3.11 was 
installed.   
On the host system the web browser Mozilla Firefox 
(version 71.0(64-bit) as a portable version were used for the 
investigation. In Firefox, due to the portable configuration, the 
browser.cache.disk.enable option was reset to the default 
value and the start page was configured to an empty page. 
The demo application was built in PHP. A virtual separate 
subpage was created for each header entry and for each 
parameter. Each page was assigned a unique ID, which was 
then searched for in the analysis. Additionally, an individual 
CSS and graphic file was integrated. To have basic data for 
the output, the first page has no header entries. For the 
investigation, first the start page was called up, then the 
subpage with the header entry being investigated and finally 
the web browser was closed.  Then the traces were examined. 
After each cycle, a cleansed copy of the web browser was 
used. For the test with the HTTPS connection the domain 
https://scheible.it has been accessed. 
III. RESULTS OVERVIEW 
The following table 1 gives an overview of the resources 
that are temporarily stored with each header entry. 
TABLE I.  OVERVIEW OF THE RESULTS 
HTTP header HTML CSS Image 
Clear-Site-Data: "*" not saved saved saved 
Cache-Control: no-store saved saved saved 
Cache-Control: no-cache not saved not saved not saved 
 
A. Clear-Site-Data 
For the experiment the header Clear-Site-Data: "*" was 
set. The result of the investigation showed that the HTML files 
are not stored in the cache with this header entry. This applies 
to both the start page and the actual test page. Although the 
entry was only set for the test page. Other resources such as 
CSS files or images were not affected. This header entry 
ensures that no version of the page is stored in the cache and 
therefore only the entry in the chronicle is available during a 
forensic analysis.  
B. HTTP header Cache-Control 
Next, the header entry Cache-Control with the options no-
store and no-cache was tested. Here, the no-cache option had 
no effect on storage, since the Web browser is instructed not 
to use the page from the cache without prior validation. 
Compared to A. Clear-Site-Data, the no-store option caches 
the home page, but does not save the actual test page. With 
this header entry in conjunction with the no-store option, 
specific individual pages cannot be saved and thus the 
examination is also disturbed.  
C. HTTP Strict Transport Security 
If a website has set an HSTS header entry, Firefox checks 
whether an entry already exists. If this is the case, it will be 
updated and if not, a new entry will be created. This attempt 
has shown that a new entry is created. Firefox manages these 
entries in a file named SiteSecurityServiceState.txt. Each 
entry for a domain is written in a single line. Besides the time 
information there is a counter for the number of visits. This is 
independent of the entry in the chronicle. An example for this 
file can be seen in the following figure 1. 
 
If, for example, the option is set that the complete 
chronicle is to be deleted when closing Firefox, the entry 
remains present. This entry allows to see how often the page 
has been visited and when the last visit took place.  
IV. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
The results of this work have shown that the transmitted 
header entries of the web server must be included in the 
analysis of the client in order to be able to perform a correct 
analysis of the traces. This allows additional insights to be 
gained during the forensic investigation. Since the found 
artifacts are not automatically removed by the option that the 
chronicle should be deleted automatically when closing, is 
particularly interesting for forensic analysis. This enables the 
proof of the access to a website, even if the history data has 
been purposefully deleted by a user. 
In order to systematically investigate this area, a more 
comprehensive demo application should be created, covering 
all relevant parameters. In addition, the investigation should 
be extended to web browsers from other vendors to get a more 
comprehensive result. These additional entries could also be 
used to uncover inconsistency in history, to uncover 
manipulations performed by users. In addition, further HTML 
functions and, where appropriate, anti-forensic methods could 
be integrated to create a test environment for analyzing the 
coverage of forensic software. 
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Figure 1: Display of the file with the HSTS entries 
